In July, the Rollback Malaria initiative rolled out its “exceptional case” for investment in eliminating malaria, a plan promising a 40:1 return on investment (ROI), rising to 60:1 in sub-Saharan Africa. Malaria elimination will purportedly bring a multi-trillion dollar windfall: $700 billion within a few short years (by 2020), growing to an impressive $4.1 trillion by 2030.
Rollback Malaria (RBM) would not explain how it arrived at its inviting rates of return, declining to provide a spreadsheet. “The Excel sheet has data from all countries that was modelled up to give the global costs so it isn’t terribly helpful,” said Helen Prytherch of the University of Basel. Prytherch would not send the spreadsheet and suggested talking with the lead economist instead.
The process of peer review prevented bringing forth the details of the estimate. “We are working on your request,” said Prytherch, who continued:
“Several scientists from different institutions worked over a two-year period to establish the new malaria targets, cost them and then to establish and implement a cost benefit analysis. They are now preparing scientific papers to get the work into the public domain. They should be ready for submission by end September.”
However, in 2010, a consortium of pro-elimination researchers concluded that "policy makers should not view the generation of substantial short-term or medium-term cost-savings as a rationale for elimination until more robust evidence is available to suggest otherwise."
Investigators at the University California at San Francisco (UCSF) subsequently sought but did not find robust evidence of cost saving. Findings from ten case studies “do not change the conclusion” that cost should not be viewed as rationale for elimination, according UCSF’s Rima Shretta. Shretta said “malaria elimination should not be pursued merely on the grounds of cost-savings as these often fail to capture all the externalities garnered by disease elimination.”
Of RBM’s plan, Shretta says “it is an advocacy document rather than an academic analysis.” RBM’s macroeconomic analysis “was done using published data rather than an empirical analysis.” In the reinterpretation of existing results, RBM “used a full-income approach which produced larger benefits than some other approaches.” Several previous studies “have not been able to do this using short term projections,” according to Shretta.
Either malaria advocacy is going to depart from established academic research, or the academic consensus might be about to change. “I think if an academic analysis supports elimination – great,” said Shretta. Rather than argue against such an analysis, Shretta seems to have adapted to its inevitability: “the benefits are often underestimated so [elimination] should not ONLY be based on an economic argument but ALSO a social, development and moral perspective.”
On the present trajectory, science will soon give its blessing to malaria eradication being wildly profitable in addition to its other virtues.
Since publication of this article, Rima Shretta disclosed to
me her membership in the task force for Action and Investment to defeat
Malaria (AIM). AIM produced the estimate of $4.1 trillion of economic benefits
to be gained from malaria elimination examined in my article. Shretta
would not explain why she did not inform me of this critical fact. However, it
is the responsibility of the journalist to establish the independence of an
observer and I regret that I failed in this regard.
Shretta disputes multiple aspects of the article. Prior to disclosing her involvement in AIM, Shretta requested a correction to the article:
I believe my opinion has been mis-represented. I do not dispute the analysis in AIM. I also have not adapted to its inevitability. The statement below is incorrect:
"Rather than argue against such an analysis, Shretta seems to have adapted to its inevitability"
We strongly believe in the case for elimination and its returns - financial and otherwise. In my opinion often the analysis does not make the case strong enough because of the other factors that cannot be measured well.
I responded in part:
I asked Richard Feachem if there was new evidence on the matter of costs and benefits. He referred me to you. You stated there was no new evidence to change the conclusion of the 2010 [Lancet] paper.
So something has to give. There is a $4 trillion discrepancy.
Shretta, now stating she was on the AIM task force, then requested multiple changes to the article, including re-working or deleting all quotations except one. She wrote in email: “I am fine with the statement that ‘malaria elimination should not be pursued merely on the grounds of cost-savings as these often fail to capture all the externalities garnered by disease elimination.’ “ However, “the rest of the quotes are out of context…”
Shretta did not reply to a question regarding her involvement with AIM. However, I withdraw the statement that Shretta adapted to the inevitability of the AIM document.
Post-publication, regarding the key question of reconciling the Lancet paper with AIM, Shretta wrote: “The Lancet paper warned on rationalizing elimination based on a financial argument alone.” Arguably, this is a considerable misinterpretation. The Lancet paper warned that short- and medium- term economic benefits cannot be part of an argument for elimination, whether alone or in conjunction with any other arguments.
Shretta’s penultimate communication states:
The AIM is based on country level data on malaria disease and a transmission model that forecasts the disease over time. This was then costed out. The analysis on the benefits is from published data. We at UCSF do not dispute the findings of AIM.